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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the 1986 Chernobyl accident and its consequences as the 
basis for an analysis of the possible dimensions of the nuclear catastrophes that could 
occur during the dismantlement process of Russia’s Northern Fleet nuclear submarines. 
It assesses the potential demographic, ecological, and economic consequences of a 
nuclear accident. Given the systemic problems at Russian nuclear facilities, the risks of a 
catastrophic event in the poorly maintained and operated submarine yards housing over 
100 operating nuclear reactors are significant. A major nuclear accident at these facilities 
could cause damage to the environment of global proportions. This thesis considers the 
potential environmental impact of a nuclear accident during the nuclear submarine 
dismantlement process and discusses the environmental damage that has already occurred 
as a result of Soviet and Russian practices. This thesis also evaluates the risk of diversion 
of nuclear materials to proliferators or terrorists. Lastly, this thesis examines how the 
United States, the European Union, and perhaps others could assist Russia in reducing the 
environmental and proliferation risks in this dismantlement process. 
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This thesis examines the 1986 Chernobyl accident and its consequences as the 
basis for an analysis of the possible dimensions of the nuclear catastrophes that could 
occur during the dismantlement process of Russia’s Northern Fleet nuclear submarines. 
It assesses the potential demographic, ecological, and economic consequences of a 
nuclear accident. Given the systemic problems at Russian nuclear facilities, the risks of a 
catastrophic event in the poorly maintained and operated submarine yards housing over 
100 operating nuclear reactors are significant. A major nuclear accident at these facilities 
could cause damage to the environment of global proportions. 
This thesis examines the current dismantlement process that takes place at the 
Nerpa Shipyard, the Northern Machine Building Enterprise (Sevmash), and the 
Zvezdochka shipyards in Severodvinsk. It considers the potential environmental impact 
of a nuclear accident during the dismantlement process and discusses the environmental 
damage that has already occurred as a result of Soviet and Russian practices. This thesis 
also evaluates the risk of diversion of nuclear materials to proliferators or terrorists. 
Lastly, this thesis examines how the United States, the European Union, and perhaps 
others could assist Russia in reducing the environmental and proliferation risks of this 
dismantlement process. 
Towards the end of 1998, the Russian Navy had retired nearly 170 nuclear- 
powered submarines from its inventory. Of those 170 submarines, the dismantlement 
process had been completed on only 40. Of those still awaiting dismantlement, 110 to 
ix 
115 still had operating reactors and nuclear fuel on board. This situation has remained 
virtually unchanged. 
The dismantlement process takes place at one of the three port facilities located 
on the Kola Peninsula. The Kola Peninsula, from the Arctic and Norwegian Seas to the 
depths of the White Sea, is dotted with Northern Fleet naval bases and naval shipyards. 
These facilities k e  home to approximately two-thirds of Russia’s nuclear- powered 
submarines and the associated problems of managing their radioactive waste. Russia’s 
capacity to dismantle these vessels, however, is limited because of economic problems. 
By 1999, the downward spiral of Russia’s economy and political immobilism had created 
a nuclear “nightmare” in the Northern Fleet. Submarines designed to operate for twenty 
years are being decommissioned early and at an alarming rate. Older first- and second- 
generation submarines are being laid up for years due to the lack of financing and the 
inability to carry out safe dismantlement. These submarines are creating a bottleneck of 
“dying” nuclear-powered submarines of potentially catastrophic proportions. 
X 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the 1986 Chernobyl accident and its consequences as the 
basis for an analysis of the possible dimensions of the nuclear catastrophes that could 
occur during the dismantlement process of the Northern Fleet nuclear submarines. It 
assesses the potential ecological and economic consequences of a nuclear accident. 
Given the systemic problems at Russian nuclear facilities, the risks of a catastrophic 
event in the poorly maintained and operated submarine yards housing over 100 operating 
nuclear reactors are significant. A major nuclear accident at these facilities could cause 
damage to the environment of global proportions. 
This thesis examines the current dismantlement process that takes place at the 
Nerpa Shipyard, the Northern Machine Building Enterprise (Sevmash), and the 
Zvezdochka shipyards in Severodvinsk. It considers the potential environmental impact 
of a nuclear accident during the dismantlement process and discusses the environmental 
damage that has already occurred as a result of Soviet and Russian practices. 
Additionally, this thesis evaluates the risk of diversion of nuclear materials to 
proliferators or terrorists. Lastly, this thesis examines how the United States, the 
European Union, and perhaps others, could assist Russia in reducing the environmental 
and proliferation risks of this dismantlement process. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Towards the end of 1998, the Russian Navy had retired nearly 170 nuclear- 
powered submarines from its inventory. Of those 170 subs, the dismantlement process 
had been completed on only 40. Of those still awaiting dismantlement, 1 10 to 1 15 still 
1 
had operating reactors and nuclear fuel on board.1 This situation has remained virtually 
unchanged. 
The dismantlement process takes place at one of the three port facilities located 
on the Kola Peninsula. Russia's capacity to dismantle these vessels, however, is limited. 
'Russia's current inability to handle the nuclear materials resulting from the 
dismantlement process further complicates the situation. These 
unexpected challenges.. .present severe financial drains on the Russian 
federal budget.. . .Russia's economic crisis has only exacerbated its 
inability to address the problems properly.2 
Moscow officials have admitted that the rapid decommissioning of the Northern 
Fleet, specifically its submarine force, has worsened the situation by creating a 
huge backlog of units that require dismantlement. Under the current system, only 
three to six submarines can be dismantled per year. 
Since the Russian economic crisis in August 1998, the dismantlement process has 
come to a near standstill. "Yet, keeping decommissioned submarines afloat as they await 
dismantlement demands a partial crew to provide general maintenance, oversee the 
reactor cooling system, and guarantee safety levels.. . . [at alcost [ofl $200,000 per sub per 
year."3 
For economic reasons, Russia has deemed the nuclear submarine dismantlement 
process a low priority. This decision has made the Kola Peninsula, the Scandinavian 
1 
Dismantlement of Nuclear Submarines," Moscow, Russia, 1 1 December 1998. 
James Clay Mole, Report on the Conference on "Perspectives on International Cooperation in the 
Tamara C. Robinson, "Submarine Dismantlement and Material Storage Challenges for Russian 
Nuclear Propulsion," (Prepared for a conference at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, 
16-17 March 1999) Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2. 
3 Ibid., 11. 
2 
countries, and to a large degree the Northern Hemisphere vulnerable to an ecological 
catastrophe. 
The Chernobyl case is relevant to this thesis as an illustration of the potential 
seriousness of nuclear accidents in the former Soviet Union. The 1986 Chernobyl 
nuclear reactor accident has caused at least fifty thousand deaths to date. Additionally, 
the heavily c o n k a t e d  areas of Ukraine and Belarus will remain uninhabitable for 
years to come. Furthermore, the radioactive cloud that emitted continuously for some 15 
days from the burning graphite RBMK- 1000 reactor spread its deadly poison over much 
of the European and Asian continents. 
The immediate concern was the risk of contamination of the fresh food supply. 
Concentrations of certain radioactive isotopes in the food chain necessitated, for example, 
the destruction of reindeer herds in Finland and Sweden. 
After some delay the Soviet government informed the public of the catastrophe 
and began evacuating the population. The Soviet government downplayed the 
seriousness of the situation presumably to reassure its own citizenry, but at the same time 
marshaled its vast bureaucratic forces to "cover up" the consequences of the accident. 
The scale and severity of the Chernobyl accident with its widespread radioactive 
contamination had not been foreseen and took by surprise most national authorities 
responsible for emergency preparedness. No provisions had been made for an accident of 
such a scale. Though some radiation protection authorities had made criteria available 
for intervention in an accident, these criteria were often incomplete and provided little 
practical help in these circumstances. Few workable national guidelines or principles 
were therefore actually in place. Local emergency response teams, unprepared for 
3 
nuclear catastrophe, were the first to respond to the accident. These local emergency 
response teams reacted in accordance with training for conventional emergencies rather 
than being directed by the informed scientific and expert judgement of trained nuclear 
response teams.4 
The Chernobyl disaster thus serves as an appropriate case study of what could 
happen without a cohesive and organized plan to deal with the potential catastrophes 
during the dismantlement process of the Russian Northern Fleet nuclear submarine force. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is based on an analytical survey of primary and secondary sources 
concerning the dismantlement process of Russian nuclear submarines, the actual and 
potential effects of this process on the environment, and the efforts of external powers to 
assist Russia in dealing with this situation. A case study of the Chernobyl accident is 
used to provide background information about a nuclear accident of significant gravity 
that may be attributed, at least in part, to procedures similar to those involved in the 
nuclear submarine dismantlement process. Additionally, interviews were conducted with 
leading experts in the fields of nuclear reactor dismantlement, nuclear proliferation, 
ecology, and foreign policy. This thesis analyzes various aspects of the dismantlement 
process and identifies potential solutions. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I1 examines the conditioning factors of the Chernobyl accident, the 
actors, the response, and the environmental impact of the Chemobyl disaster. Chapter I11 
"The Chernobyl Nuclear Accident and its Ramifications, " Nuclear Energy Agency, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.infoukes.com/history/chornobyl/idex.html. [24 August 19991. 
4 
discusses the current status and condition of the dismantlement process and the Northern 
Fleet submarines involved. Additionally, it considers the challenges and problems 
associated with the dismantlement process. Chapter IV discusses the current 
environmental damage as a result of the dismantlement process, the non-proliferation 
risks involved with the process, and the potential for further environmental damage. 
Chapter V surveys the external assistance provided to Russian efforts and provides 
recommendations in support of safe and efficient management of the dismantlement 
process. Additionally, Chapter V offers conclusions about the importance of improving 
this process, in view of the potential for environmental damage of global proportions. 
5 
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11. CHERNOBYL: A CASE STUDY 
A. THE ACCIDENT AND ITS CONDITIONING FACTORS 
On 26 April 1986 an accident occurred at the fourth unit of the Chernobyl nuclear 
power station in Ukraine, then part of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the destruction 
of the reactor core and part of the building in which it was housed. Large amounts of the 
radioactive material were released into the surrounding environment. Hot materials were 
expelled, starting fires that exacerbated the situation and lifted more radioactive material 
high into the air. 
Although the most intense releases of radioactivity were shortly after the 
accident, there were large releases 20-21 days and 25-30 days after the 
accident attributed to new local releases fiom "heated zones" of the 
reactor.5 
The accident at Chernobyl occurred during a test being carried out on a 
turbogenerator at the time of a normal scheduled shutdown of the reactor. This was 
intended to test the ability of the turbogenerator, during station blackout, to supply 
electrical energy for a short period until the standby diesel generators could supply 
emergency power. The test procedures were improperly written from the safety point of 
view, and serious violations of basic operating rules put the reactor at low power (200 
MW (th)) operation in coolant flow rate; and the cooling conditions could not be 
stabilized by manual control. "The major factor contributing to the accident was a severe 
violation of operating rules by personnel, which put the reactor operation in an unsafe 
Don J. Bradley, Behind the Nuclear Curtain: Radioactive Waste Management in the Former Soviet 
Union (Co1umbus:Batelle Press, 1997), 345. 
7 
regime."6 Subsequent events led to the generation of an increasing amount of steam 
voids in the reactor core, thereby introducing positive reactivity. The beginning of an 
increasingly rapid rise in power was seen, and a manual attempt was made to stop the 
chain reaction. However, the manual trip, which the test would have triggered earlier, 
had been blocked. Consequently, the possibility of a rapid shutdown of the reactor was 
limited, as almost all the control rods had been withdrawn completely from the core. 
Soviet experts calculated that, due to continued reactivity, the first power peak reached 
100 times nominal power within four seconds. 
Energy released in the fuel by the power excursion suddenly ruptured part of the 
fuel into minute pieces. Small hot fuel particles (and possibly also evaporated fuel) 
caused a steam explosion. The energy release shifted the 1000-ton reactor cover plate 
and resulted in all cooling channels on both sides of the reactor cover being cut. After 
two to three seconds an additional explosion was heard, and hot pieces of the reactor 
were ejected from the destroyed reactor building. 
B. ACTORS AND RESPONSE 
According to Robert Ebel's authoritative account, 
0 Local stafT did not realize the enormity of events at Chernobyl. 
The magnitude of the disaster became clear only when authorities 
arrived from Moscow the evening of the first day. 
0 Early reports from local authorities to Moscow seriously 
understated the disaster. Later on, information was deliberately 
withheld to prevent panic in Kiev, a city of some 2.3 million 
located south of Chernobyl.7 
Ibid., 345. 
Robert Ebel, Chernobyl and Its ABermath: A Chronology of Events (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 2. 
8 
The national authorities in Moscow were alerted about the accident on 26 April 
and a specialist team was immediately dispatched to the site to assist local authorities and 
plant management to deal with the situation. Initially there were problems in accurately 
reporting the severity of the accident at the plant and off-site. 
On their arrival, the specialist team found a very serious situation. One of the 
initial decisions was that a precautionary evacuation of the town of Pripyat should be 
carried out as soon as possible. "The USSR had no 'ready to go' evacuation plans 
pertaining to nuclear power plants."* 
All the protective measures and deployment of resources and personnel were 
ordered and coordinated by a special commission. Decontamination procedures 
performed by military personnel included washing buildings, cleaning residential areas, 
removing contaminated soil, cleaning roads, and decontaminating water supplies. 
Special attention was paid to schools, hospitals, and other buildings used by large 
numbers of people. Streets were watered down in towns to suppress dust.9 
The removal of radioactive dust from the roof of unit No. 4 was performed by the 
military as well. Sophisticated remote-controlled equipment, some of it imported fiom 
West Germany and other countries, could not do the job. Electronic circuits failed due to 
the effects of radiation. Later, tractor robots were used on the roof, their sophisticated 
electronics having been replaced with conventional relays. 10 Ultimately, however, 
bid. ,  1. 
"The Chernobyl Nuclear Accident and its Ramifications," Nuclear Energy Agency. 
l o  Robert Ebel, 24. 
9 
soldiers using wheelbarrows and working in 90-second shifts to minimize their exposure 
to the lethal radioactive dust performed the cleanup.11 
Personnel seriously ill from radiation were sent to Moscow Hospital number 6. 
Western doctors remarked on the sophistication shown by the staff in 
handling radiation burns, surmising that this could only have come from 
experience. Their observations tended to confirm suspicions of a major 
nuclear accident in.the Urals, a long kept secret, during the winter of 
1957-1958. Moscow now admits that an accident did take place. 
Evidence suggests that the accident was more damaging than the blast at 
Chernobyl. l2 
As Robert Ebel has noted, "Following the explosion at Chernobyl, international 
help was offered to the USSR, but limited amounts were accepted."13 Western European 
countries provided supplies and equipment to fight the fire, and remote-controlled 
equipment for the cleanup. 
Although the emergency response had to be initiated at the local level, the 
management of the emergency situation required a rapid acceleration of resource 
commitments. Because of the scale of the accident, such resources, and the authority for 
their commitment, could not be expected to exist at the local level. 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
As Zhores Medvedev has observed, "Fall-out from the Chernobyl accident was 
detected in every country of the Northern Hemisphere."l4 While the Soviet Union 
sustained the most serious contamination, livestock and crops outside the USSR were 
l 1  Ibid. 
l2 Ibid.,3. 
13 Ibid., 1. 
l4 Zhores A. Medvedev, The Legacy of Chernobyl (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), 220. 
10 
affected. The areas of the heaviest contamination remain off limits to their former 
residents and will be for many years to come. 
While it is still too early to gauge the long term effects of the disaster, projections 
based on the amount of radiation received by different populations predict a measurable 
increase in the cancer rate within the heavily contaminated areas and a statistically 
insignificant increase throughout the Northern Hemisphere. 
The radionuclide contaminants of most significance in agriculture are 
those which are relatively highly taken up by crops, have high rates of 
transfer to animal products such as milk and meat, and have relatively 
long radiological half-lives.. .. The major radionuclides of concern.. .are 
iodine 131, caesium-137, caesium-134, and strontium 90.15 
Cesium'37 (137Cs) is the primary long-term contaminant because of the amount of 
radionuclides released. Cesium'37 damages the body during ingestion and inhalation, and 
through absorption as background radiation from contaminated areas.16 However, the 
amount of 137Cs contamination in the body will decrease over time. The official United 
States estimate for the amount of 137Cs released from Chernobyl was three million curies, 
distributed as follows: one third in the former Soviet Union, one third in Europe, and the 
final third throughout the Northern Hemisphere.17 
Conversely, "Sr, with a thirty-year half-life, is regarded as a more serious threat 
than 137Cs. According to Medvedev, 
"Chernobyl, Ten Years On" National Energ Agency. Available 
[Online]:<http://www.nea.fi/html/rp/ reports/l995/chernobyl/allchernobyl.htm. [ 19 August 19991.44-45. 
l6 Medvedev, 167-178. 
Ibid., 21 1. 
11 
Soviet regulators treat "Sr more seriously than 137Cs because it becomes 
fixed in bones for the rest of human life if it gets into the food chain. It is 
therefore leukaemogenic. 18 
Iodine 13' (1311) has a half-life of a little over one week. Even with its short half- 
life, 1311 is the primary cause of thyroid cancer because that gland attracts iodine. The 
dumping of milk throughout Europe and the Soviet Union was primarily due to 1311 
contamination. Children are highly susceptible to thyroid cancer because the gland is still 
growing. The primary route to the thyroid is through ingestion of milk and fresh 
vegetables.19 These contaminants became so densely concentrated in certain areas that 
they were designated exclusion zones. 
The only country that had to resort to exclusion areas was the Soviet Union. 
About 4,700 km2 of land is still off limits to personnel, 2,600 km2 in Belarus and 2,100 
km2 Northwest of the Chernobyl power plant.20 137Cs to an extent greater than 37,000 
Bq/m2 contaminated 125,000 km2 of land in what is now the former Soviet Union.21 Of 
that land, over 52,000 km2 was under cultivation.22 Ironically, Chernobyl is located in 
Ukraine, which was the breadbasket of the Soviet Union. 
Over 100,000 people from the Chernobyl area have been permanently resettled, 
but 275,000 continue to live in highly contaminated areas.23 The population that is still 
l8 Ibid., 178. 
l9  "Chernobyl, Ten Years On," National Energy Agency. 36-37. 
2o Ibid., 46. 
21 Ibid.,45. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 32. 
12 
living in the contaminated areas has already absorbed a maximum accumulated dose of 
25 rem. To avoid moving these people, the Ukrainian government has raised the 
maximum permissible dose to 35 rem.24 
European countries received contamination due to local precipitation that brought 
the radioactive contaminants back to earth. Scandinavia and the United Kingdom were 
the hardest hit. In the United Kingdom, 475,000 sheep could not be sent for slaughter 
due to excessive levels of contaminants in 1987.25 170,000 reindeer were heavily 
contaminated and another 300,000 were lightly contaminated in Northern Scandinavia, 
and 50,000 were destroyed to avoid contamination of the local population. This nearly 
destroyed the ancient traditions of the Lapp nation.26 
If, as some officials had initially intended, the contaminated herds had 
been destroyed, the Lapps would almost certainly have been assimilated 
with the Swedes, Finns and Nonvegians.27 
The reindeer were affected due to their diet of lichen; this plant has no roots and 
gets its nutrients fiom the surface and is thus easily contaminated. It is estimated that 
137Cs levels in the reindeer population will not fall below 1000 kBq/kg for thirty-six 
years.28 
24 Medvedev, 186. 
25 Ibid., 218. 




The original limit for 137Cs contamination was 300 kBqkg, but the Swedish 
government raised the maximum level to 1,500 kE3qkg to allow consumption by the 
migratory population that relies on the reindeer for f00d.29 
Fifteen percent of the Swedish lakes were also contaminated, thus putting them 
off limits to fishermen for decades.30 The Swedes also identified localized pockets of 
contamination in the south and had to destroy crops, pastures, and milk supplies to avoid 
contaminating the local populations. 
The full story of Chernobyl's health effects may never be accurately known due 
to Soviet secrecy, the amount of territory affected, and the unparalleled amount of 
radiation released. Scientists estimate that Chernobyl's release of radiation exceeded 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, combined, by more than two hundred times.31 One of the few 
facts that is certain about Chernobyl is that thirty-one plant workers and firefighters lost 
their lives in the explosion and resulting fire. Three died in the explosion, and the other 
twenty-eight died of acute radiation poisoning. Of the 499 persons observed at area 
hospitals after the explosion, 237 were immediately diagnosed with radiation sickness.32 
According to David Marples, director of the Stasiuk program on Contemporary 
Ukraine: 
29 Medvedev, 199. 
30 "Chemobyl, Ten Years Ontt National Energy Agency. 48. 
"Chemobyl Status, April 1997." Available [Online]:<http//www.greenpeace.org/-comms/97 /nuclear 
/reactor/chernl 1.html. [14 August 19991.2. 
32 "Chemobyl, Ten Years On," National Energy Agency. 34. 
14 
I have encountered totally undocumented estimates as high as 125,000 
deaths among these workers .... Of these, at least 5,000 had died by 
1990 .... The National Committee for Radiation Protection of the 
Ukrainian Population recently issued what appear to be reliable figures, 
indicating that 5,772 liquidators [workers] have died.33 
In his book Chernobyl: A Documentary Story, Lurii Scherbak recounts a truly 
heroic tale of the first people to arrive at the explosion. Of all the eyewitness accounts of 
ambulance drivers, firefighters, and plant personnel, the most amazing concern the 
actions of the initial firefighters. Through overwhelming bravery and dedication or a lack 
of understanding about radiation, these first crews put themselves in the most dangerous 
situation, immediately climbing directly over the exposed core to fight the fire that blazed 
below them. Every one of these firefighters was dead within a week.34 
Not all of the people whose health was affected by Chernobyl died. Many 
medical studies have focused on other health problems experienced by people living near 
the power plant. Unfortunately, poor pre-explosion records were kept for that population, 
so many conclusions reached by these studies are educated guesses at best. Still, there 
seems to be no doubt about radical increases in some cancer rates. 
In Belarus, for example, the lung cancer rate for those evacuated from Chernobyl 
was four times the average of the rest of the population.35 On the basis of the national 
statistics of Belarus, UNICEF has concluded that bone marrow, muscle tissue, and 
33 David R. Marples, "Chemobyl's Toll After 10 Years." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist. May/June 1996 
Issue. Available [Online]:<http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/l996/mj96/marplesoped.html. [ 12 August 
19991. 1. 
34 Lurii Shcherback, Chernobyl: A Documentary Story (Canadian Institute of Ukranian Studies, 1989), 
37. 
35 David R. Marples, "Chemobyl's Toll After Ten Years." 1. 
connective tissue system disorders have increased sixty-two percent, while malignant 
tumors have increased thirty-eight percent. Perhaps the most dramatic development has 
been the 100-fold increase in thyroid cancer in children.36 
According to the Institute of Radiation Medicine, 
The appearance of thyroid tumors among children in the contaminated 
zones had made a sudden and dramatic appearance, increasing in Belarus 
by more than five times between 1989 and 1990. All the children were 
born shortly before or during the time of the Chernobyl disaster. There is 
a clear correlation between these cancers and Chernobyl-produced 
radiation.37 
The number of thyroid cancer cases continues to rise. The World Health 
Organization estimates that one in ten children who lived in the contaminated zone will 
develop thyroid cancer, which would equate to roughly 10,000 cases. In the years since 
Chernobyl, both Belarus and Ukraine have experienced negative population growth? 
The causes of these declines in population probably involve factors in addition to 
Chernobyl, however. Post-Soviet Russia has also experienced population declines, and 
many factors other than radiation appear to have contributed to these demographic 
shortfalls.39 
36 “Chernobyl Status, April 1997.” 2. 
37 David R. Marples, “Chemobyl’s Lengthening Shadow,” The Bullefin ofAfomic Scientist. Sep. 93 issue. 
Available [Online]:<http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1993/s93Marples.html. [ 12 August 19991. 5. 
38 David R. Marples, “The facts about the aftermath,” Ukrainian Weekly. No. 16, Vol. LXIV (April 26, 
1996). Available [Online]:<http://www.ukweekly.codkchive/1996/1696 lO.htm1. [ 1 Sept 19991. 
39 Nicholas Eberstadt, “Russia: Too Sick to Matter,” Policy Review. June/July 1999, No 95. Available 
[ O n l i n e ] : ~ h t t p : / / w w w . p o l i c y r e v i e w . c o m / j u l .  
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David Marples sums up the environment and health affects of Chernobyl as 
follows: "the scale of the problem is reminiscent of the rebuilding after the German- 
Soviet war."40 
D. CONCLUSION 
The explosion of reactor No. 4 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant had both 
immediate and long-term effects on the health of the people who came into contact with 
the deadly radiation. In the entire previous history of nuclear power plants only 620 
persons had been exposed to acute radiation (defined as greater than 6.0 Gy), of whom 33 
died. At Chernobyl, over 24,500 people were exposed to acute radiation.41 Though 
accounts vary, most estimates of Chernobyl's death toll are in excess of 10,000 people, 
with more expected. Many have moved back into the contamination zone and will 
therefore continue to experience the harmful effects of radiation. Scientists and medical 
experts predict the explosion's immediate effects will continue to harm human health 
until the youngest people alive on 26 April 1986 eventually die off. The enduring effects 
of the explosion will, to be sure, last for many more years, as noted above. 
Was the Chernobyl accident an isolated incident? How significant are the risks of 
another nuclear incident and further environmental damage in the former Soviet Union? 
At a press conference held on 25 April 1997, the day prior to the eleventh anniversary of 
the Chernobyl accident, Vladimir Slivyak, an analyst with the Socio-Ecological Union, 
gave a report regarding the present status of the nuclear industry in Russia. 
40 David R. Marples, "Chernobyl's Lengthening Shadow," 3. 
41 David Mould, Chernobyl: The ReaZStory (Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, 1988), 152. 
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According to updated information submitted by the Russian State 
Radiation Control Authority (GAN), 11 incidents were reported at Russian 
nuclear power plants (NPPs) during January 1997. In 1994 there were 126 
incidents, sinking to 99 in 1995. One main reason for the low 1995 
number was the fact that some of the 9 reactor installations were under 
repair during that year. According to GAN only some 30% of the planned 
safety improvement measures at the reactor installations were completed 
by the end of 1996.42 
The accidents and incidents at these nuclear power plants are not limited to the 
RBMK type of nuclear reactor associated with Chernobyl. Rather, they involve all the 
nuclear reactors in the Russian inventory, including the reactors in nuclear submarines of 
the Northern Fleet undergoing the dismantlement process on the Kola Peninsula. The 
management, storage, and handling of nuclear materials associated with the nuclear 
submarine dismantlement process may present the greatest danger of another 
"Chernobyl-like" accident. 
~~ 
42 Status of the Russian Nuclear Power Plants." Bellona (28 April 1997): Available 
[Online]:<http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/incidents.html. [ 10 September, 19991. Pagination of this 
document is impossible because it is frequently updated. This applies to all www.bellona.no references in 
this thesis. 
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111. CURRENT STATUS OF THE DISMANTLEMENT PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For more than 40 years the Soviet Union and the United States engaged in a Cold 
War based in part on ideological conflict. This conflict was the catalyst for an arms race 
that proceeded with little to no long term planning or preparation for its aftermath, One 
of the aspects of this competition was the building of each nation's nuclear submarine 
force. By the end of 1994, the Soviet Union and its principal successor state, Russia, had 
constructed a total of 245 nuclear ~ubmarines.4~ The majority of these submarines 
contain two nuclear reactors. 
Soviet Russia had four main fleets, but the Northern Fleet became the largest and 
most important because of its ice-free ports, its geographic location, and its large nuclear 
submarine force.44 It also became the fleet with the greatest potential for a nuclear 
environmental catastrophe. 
The Northern Fleet's nuclear submarines operate out of five naval bases on the 
Kola Peninsula: Zapadnaya Litsa, Vidyayevo, Gadzhievo, Severmorsk, and Gremikha. 
Additionally, these bases have numerous facilities for operating nuclear vessels, for 
storing various levels of solid and liquid radioactive waste (SRW and LRW), and for 
43 Jill Tatko and Tamara Robinson, "Naval Nuclear Vessels Overview," Monterey 
International Studies, 1999. Available 
[Online]:~http://www.cns.edu/db/nisprofs/~ssia/naval/overview.h~. [2October 19991. 
44 Jill Tatko and Tamara Robinson, "Northern Fleet Overview," Monterey Institute of 
Studies, 1999. Available 
Institute of 
International 
[Online]:~http://www.cns.edu/db/nisprofs/russia/naval/nucfl~no~~norflo~.h~. [2 October 19991. 
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land-based storage of spent fuel as~emblies.~5 The Northern Fleet also utilizes six naval 
yards on the Kola Peninsula: Nerpa, Safonovo, Sevmorput, and Shkval in the Murmansk 
region, and Sevmash and Zvezdochka in the Arlangelsk region.46 It is important to 
understand the location of these bases and shipyards because of the proximity of their 
radioactive material to populated areas, and to the Barents Sea, the White Sea, and the 
Arctic Ocean. 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL LAYOUT OF RUSSIAN NAVAL BASES 
Zapadnaya Litsa, located forty-five kilometers from the Norwegian border on the 
Barents Sea, is the largest submarine base in Russia, housing nearly twenty-five 
submarines. There are four additional naval facilities associated with this base: Andreeva 
Bay, Bolshaya Lopatka, Malaya Lopatka, and Nerpicha. The city of Zaozersk 
(population 30,000) supports the naval base and its facilities.47 
1. Andreeva Bay 
Andreeva Bay is located about five kilometers from Zaozersk, on the west side of 
the Litsa Fjord. Although there are no nuclear-powered submarines based there, it is the 
primary storage facility for the Northern Fleet's radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. 
"A total of 21,000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies and about 12,000 m3 of solid radioactive 
45 Bradley, 24 1-242. 
46 Ibid., 242. 
47 Ibid., 244-247. 
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waste and liquid radioactive waste are stored at Andreeva Bay. This figure also includes 
contaminated equipment and construction material still remaining in Building 5 .'I48 
2. Bolshaya Lopatka 
Bolshaya Lopatka, located on the other side of the Litsa Fjord fiom Andreeva 
Bay, has eight piers and a servicing dock for submarine storage and repair. There is 
about 2 m3 of solid radioactive waste stored here, as well as a smaller storage facility for 
liquid radioactive waste. When these storage facilities are full, the excess waste is 
transported to Andreeva B a ~ . ~ g  
3. Malaya Lopatka 
Malaya Lopatka, located two kilometers fiom Bolshaya Lopatka, was the first 
naval facility constructed for the repair and servicing of nuclear-powered submarines. 
There are five piers and a floating dock for such maintenance.s0 
4. Nerpicha 
Nerpicha is the innermost naval facility of the Zapadnaya complex. Its submarine 
piers were available in the 1970s. The six Typhoon SSBNs are currently based here. 
There are also storage facilities for solid and liquid radioactive waste. These facilities are 
rather small, so radioactive waste is continuously transported to Andreeva Bay.51 
Vidyayevo naval base consists of two additional naval facilities: Ara Bay and Ura 
Bay. It became a facility for nuclear-powered submarines in 1979. There are currently 
48 Ibid., 245. 
Northern Fleet facilities are addressed in Chapter IV of this thesis. 
Specifics concerning the problems associated with radioactive waste storage at the 
49 Ibid., 247. 
50 Ibid. 
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fourteen nuclear-powered submarines, containing twenty-three fueled reactors, laid-up52 
in Ara Bay. Additionally, there are small storage facilities for SRW and LRW. Three 
partially constructed tunnels at Ara Bay, initially designed to conceal submarines, are in 
the planning stages to become an interim repository for nuclear reactors and radioactive 
waste.53 
Gadzhievo also consists of two additional naval facilities: Sayda Bay, formerly 
the fishing village of Gadzhievo, and Olenya Bay. As of 1995, Sayda Bay housed twelve 
nuclear-powered submarines and twelve reactor compartments at its three piers. An 
additional reactor compartment containing twenty tons of SRW was expected in 1996. 
Nuclear-powered submarines have been stationed at Gadzhievo since the early 1960s, 
primarily because of the facilities for removing spent nuclear fuel. There are 200 m3 of 
LRW and 2,037 m3 of SRW stored at various facilities throughout the base. There are 
nine submarines based at Olenya Bay, six of which are laid-up for dismantlement.54 
Severmorsk, located twenty-five kilometers north of the city of Murmansk, serves 
as the administration center for the Northern Fleet. There are a large number of naval 
surface combatants based here, of which two are nuclear-powered. Safonovo, a nearby 
naval shipyard, is the only local facility that services nuclear-powered submarines.55 
51 Ibid.,248. 
52 The term "laid-up" refers to the nuclear submarine that has been decommissioned, but that still has its 
reactors on board. The prospect of 
recommissioning is unlikely. Most Russian nuclear submarines have two reactors. 
The reactors can be operating or in a storage capacity. 
53 Bradley, 248. 
54 Ibid., 248-249. 
55 Ibid., 249. 
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Gremikha, located 280 kilometers east of Murmansk, is the easternmost naval 
base of the Northern Fleet. Currently there are fifteen laid-up nuclear submarines 
containing twenty-six heled reactors awaiting dismantlement. There are also three large 
radioactive waste storage facilities with major safety concerns similar to those at 
Andreeva Bay-namely, the lack of efficient and safe arrangements for storage of 
nuclear materials.56 Gremikha has become the "bone yard" for decommissioned nuclear- 
powered submarines, with seventeen to nineteen subs laid-up for dismantlement. 
All of the aforementioned naval bases are located on the Barents Sea, although 
Severmorsk lies well inside the Kola fjord. This is important to note because of the 
environmental damage that has occurred and is occurring to the Barents Sea, Kara Sea, 
and Arctic Ocean.57 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL LAYOUT OF RUSSIAN NAVAL SHIPYARDS 
There are six naval shipyards on the Kola Peninsula: Shkul, Safonovo, 
Sevmorput, and Nerpa located in the Murmansk region, and Sevmash and Zvezdochka 
located in the Arkangelsk region. The Ministry of Shipbuilding administers Sevmash, 
Zvezdochka, and Nerpa, whereas the Ministry of Defence administers Shkval, Safonovo, 
and Sevmorput.58 There appears to be a disparity in the subordination of these facilities 
which seems to exacerbate the problems of accountability and responsibility in the 
dismantlement process. 
56 Ibid., 250. 
97 This environmental damage is discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis. 
58 Thomas Nilsen, Igor Kudrick and Alexandr Nikitin, "The Russian Northern Fleet Naval Yards," 




Shkval, located on the western side of the Murmansk fjord near the town of 
Polyamy (population 70,000), has seven nuclear-powered submarines laid-up. One of 
those subs, a first-generation Echo 11, has a damaged reactor that cannot be touched due 
to the radiation level in the reactor compartment. Additionally, the radioactive waste 
storage facilities'(tw0 tanks of 150 m3) are full. Hence, there are two hundred radioactive 
waste containers and other contaminated material placed in open storage. Shkval faces 
extensive economic problems, as with all the Russian naval yards.59 
2. Safonovo 
Safonovo is located on the eastern side of the Murmansk fjord between 
Munnansk and Severomorsk. The SSBNs and nuclear surface combatants are repaired 
here. 
3. Sevmorput 
Sevmorput is located on the eastern side of the Murmansk fjord, between the 
nuclear icebreaker base, Atomflot, and the city of Murmansk (located a few hundred 
meters away). Sevmorput serviced nuclear-powered submarines from the 1960s until 
1991, when officials prohibited nuclear refueling due to radiation safety concerns for the 
population of Murmansk. Originally, Sevmorput had open air storage for SRW and low- 
level waste (LLW) in containers, but the theft of three fuel assemblies in November 1993 
resulted in all the fuel assemblies being transported to other facilities.60 One submarine 
with he1 and one submarine without fuel are laid-up here pending dismantlement. 
59 Ibid. 
6o Bradley, 25 1-252. 
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4. Nerpa 
Nerpa, located a few kilometers west of Polyamy and five kilometers southwest 
of Mumansk-60 on the Kola fjord, is one of three naval yards responsible for the 
dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines. There are generally two submarines in 
the process of dismantlement, but to date, due to the inability of the Northern Fleet to 
finance this process, only two nuclear-powered submarines have been dismantled: one 
Victor I SSN and one Charlie I1 SSN. 
Nerpa has a 500 m2 (5400 sq.fi.) open air storage facility of SRW approximately 
100 meters fiom the sea. There are 200 m3 (7000 cu.ft.) of SRW weighing 250 tons in 
airtight containers. Originally, this waste was collected by Northem Fleet ships and 
dumped into the Kara Sea. Additionally, there is a 70 m3 storage tank of LRW.61 
5. Servodvinsk 
The city of Severodvinsk lies on the White Sea thirty-five kilometers west of 
Arkangelsk. With minor exceptions, Severodvinsk has been a closed city since 1936. 
The population of over 200,000 grew up around, and in support of, the two largest naval 
shipyards in the Northern Fleet: Sevmash and Zvezdochka. Both of these facilities were 
originally designed for the construction and repair of nuclear-powered submarines, but 
since 1992, they have also served, along with Nerpa, as the main facilities for the 
decommissioning of nuclear-powered submarines. These facilities currently have twelve 
to seventeen submarines laid-up awaiting dismantlement and four floating reactors fiom 
previous submarine dismantlements awaiting proper long-term storage. 
61 Nilsen et al. 1995. 
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There are four storage facilities for SRW in Severodvinsk. One is located near 
the city of Mironova Heights and the other three within the shipyards. Until 1991 most 
of the SRW in this area was dumped in the Kara Sea. There are over 12,000 m3 of 
radioactive waste stored in Severodvinsk, some of which has been stored haphazardly, 
creating an inherently unsafe environment.62 
Consequently, the coastline of the entire Kola Peninsula, fiom the Arctic and 
Norwegian Seas to the depths of the White Sea, is dotted with Northern Fleet naval bases 
and naval shipyards. These facilities are home to approximately two-thirds of Russia's 
nuclear- powered submarines and the associated problems of managing their radioactive 
waste. 
The downward spiral of Russia's economy and political system has created a 
nuclear "nightmare" in the Northern Fleet. Submarines that were designed to operate for 
twenty years are being decommissioned early and at an alarming rate. Older first and 
second-generation submarines are being laid up for years due to the lack of financing and 
the government's inability to carry out a safe dismantlement process. This situation has 
resulted in a bottleneck of "dying" nuclear-powered submarines of catastrophic 
proportions. According to Kostev, 
[Tlhe Navy does not have enough money for the conservation of ships 
withdrawn fiom active service. Under lack of financing, the Navy lacks 
funds for maintaining combat ships in proper conditions. It means that it 
[the Navy] is not interested in allocating money in maintaining 
decommissioning ships reliably conserved. It [the Navy] is not interested 
as well in investing into preserving [the] ecological situation in areas, 
where dismantling nuclear powered ships are concentrated.63 
62 Bradley, 252-253. 
63 Georgi Kostev, Nuclear Safety Challenges in the Operation and Dismantlement of Russian Nuclear 
Submarines (Moscow: Committee for Critical Technologies and Non-Proliferation, 1997), 37. 
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Concerning the bottleneck problem of decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines, 
Tatko and Robinson made the following comments: 
Although reports may vary, figures published in March 1998 indicate that 
the Northern Fleet has forty-seven operational nuclear submarines.. . . A 
total of ninety-two Northern Fleet nuclear-powered submarines had been 
decommissioned by July 1998. Of this total, sixty-five submarines have 
not been defueled. Only two submarines had been completely dismantled 
as of fall 1997.64 
As of July 1999, it is estimated that there are 104 decommissioned submarines 
laid-up, due to financial and technological problems and a lack of storage facilities, at 
Northern Fleet naval bases and shipyards, of which seventy-two have not been 
defueled.65 According to Tatko and Robinson, 
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.. . . the 
Northern Fleet faces a number of problems related to its aging fleet, the 
naval nuclear fuel cycle, decommissioning and dismantlement demands, 
radioactive waste and contamination, and the Russian military's severe 
economic problems.66 
The conditions of Russia's radioactive waste management, primarily the long- 
term storage and disposal crisis, will probably continue to deteriorate as long as the 
bottleneck in the dismantlement process persists and the economic situation worsens. 
D. THE DISMANTLEMENT PROCESS 
Beginning in the 1980s, first generation Soviet nuclear-powered submarines 
began being retired and laid-up pending dismantlement. However, no plan to safely carry 
64 Tatko and Robinson, "Northern Fleet Overview" 
65 Cristina Chuen, Monterey Institute of International Studies, interview by author, 13 March 2000. The 
sources cited for this conclusion include: Rocky's Information Service, htto://members.xoom.com, 
Kvaerner Maritime's "Status and Review of the Masterplan for Disposal of Russian Nuclear Submarines," 
1 June 1999, June's Fighting Ships 1999/2000, 5580571, and NISNP discussions with DOD personnel, 
December 1999. 
27 
out the process was ever initiated. Since then, Russia has not decommissioned and/or 
dismantled a single submarine with the issues of handling and storing nuclear materials 
satisfactorily resolved. Prior to the 198Os, older nuclear submarines were kept in service 
until it was no longer feasible to safely operate them, at which point the submarines were 
either laid-up or dumped in the Kara Sea. In 1993, Russia ceased the latter practice and 
pledged to abide by the protocols of the London Dumping Convention. 
According to Nilsen, Kudrik, and Nikitin, Russian nuclear submarines are 
currently decommissioned for three reasons. 
Firstly, some of the vessels are more than 25 years old and past their 
effective service life. Some of them have undergone serious accidents and 
are beyond repair. Secondly, the greatly reduced Russian defense budget 
precludes maintenance and upgrading of the large cold war force of 
nuclear submarines established by the Soviet Union. Thirdly, 
international disarmament treaties for the reduction of naval nuclear 
strategic warheads require a reduction in the number of submarines.67 
Because the Russian government has never given the decommissioning and 
dismantlement process proper consideration and funding, the process is not simply a 
Russian national problem, but an international problem. 
If one were to create a list of the stages involved in the dismantlement process, it 
would seem rather simple: 
0 
0 
removal of the submarine from active status 
extraction of the spent nuclear fuel and disconnecting of nuclear reactor 
circuits 
transport of spent fuel for reprocessing 
containment of the low- and high-level radioactive wastes 
removal of missiles 
dismantlement of the ballistic missile launch tubes (for SSBNs) 
removal and recovery of reusable equipment and metals 
66 Tatko and Robinson, "Northern Fleet Overview.'' 1. 





separation of the reactor compartment from the rest of the hull 
sealing of the reactor compartment for long term storage 
and scrapping of the remaining parts.68 
However, the Russian Navy is not prepared to handle the tasks on this list. In 
fact, "this rapid, simultaneous, grand-scale decommissioning of [nuclear] submarines of 
multiple generations and classes not only complicates the dismantlement process, but also 
jeopardizes the environment."69 
Some Russian officials refer to the decommissioning and dismantlement process 
as "The Program," and no one in the Russian government wants to take responsibility for 
it.70 In 1986, governmental decree number 095-296 outlined the guidelines for the 
dismantlement process. In July 1992, governmental decree number 5 14 was ratified, 
assigning the naval shipyards of Severodvinsk in the Arkangelsk region, Sevmash and 
Zvezdochka, and Nerpa in the Munnansk region, the jurisdiction of carrying out "The 
Program." In June 1994, the problems associated with "The Program" were raised by the 
Duma. The Commission for Emergency Action raised the same problems again in March 
1995, but, in both cases, the decrees and the discussion fell on deaf ears. Hence, no 
submarine to date has been responsibly decommissioned and dismantled, in compliance 
with the safety regulations. Indeed, some nuclear-powered submarines have been 
dismantled, but their reactor compartments have been either dumped in the sea or are still 
68 Jill Tatko and Tamara Robinson, "Decommissioning and Dismantlement Overview," Monterey 
Institute of International Studies, 1998. Available 
[Online]:~http://www.cns.edu/db/nisprofs/russia/naval/decom/decomo~.h~. [2 October 19991. 1. 
69 hid.  
70 Kostev, 85. 
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floating on the sea.71 Nilsen, Kudrik, and Nikitin make the following points concerning 
the safe dismantlement process of Russian nuclear-powered submarines: 
According to Russian] naval yard authorities, safe decommissioning of 
nuclear submarines will not be possible for another five to seven years. 
The Russian Ministry of Defence claims that the present economic 
situation rules out a sustainable rate of decommissioning before 2005- 
2010.72 
Spurred by Russia's declining economic conditions in the 199Os, the priority of 
the Northern Fleet has been to service the operational submarines rather than those in a 
decommissioned status. "Between 1988- 1995, only ten Northern Fleet nuclear-powered 
submarines have been defueled."73 
The actual process is actually quite cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive. 
Once a vessel has been decommissioned, it is transferred to the appropriate naval 
shipyard, unless it is laid-up elsewhere for countless years. The hull is then cut into three 
parts to facilitate the removal of the missile compartment, if applicable. The three parts 
are then welded back together and the submarine is set afloat pending the removal of its 
nuclear fuel and reactor compartment. 
dismantling slot becomes available in Sevmash, Zvezdochka or Nerpa.74 
This process cannot be completed until a 
Defueling a nuclear submarine involves the removal of radioactive fuel 
assemblies from the reactors. The fuel assemblies are then temporarily stored until they 
are shipped off for reprocessing or long-term storage. Under ideal conditions, the fuel 
71 Nilsen et a1.1995. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Bradley, 290. 
74 Ibid., 291. 
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assemblies would be transported from temporary storage to Murmansk where they would 
be loaded into special transport containers (TK-18), loaded onto special rail cars (TK- 
VG-18) and transported to a special chemical processing plant in Mayak. Mayak is 
located in Siberia, 3,000 kilometers from Murmansk. Murmansk is the only site for the 
transfer of fuel assemblies because it is the only facility with a central railroad system 
capable of handling the special rail cars. Fuel assemblies located in Severodvinsk, 
Gremikha, Andreeva Bay, and other areas outside of Munnansk, are transported by 
special transport service ships to Murmansk when storage is available. There are plans to 
build and update the current rail systems in the Sererodvinsk area to establish direct 
access to Mayak.75 
Each TK-18 container can house a maximum of forty-nine fuel assemblies and 
each TK-VG-18 rail car can transport three TK-18 containers. Only four of these special 
railcars have been placed into service. Hence, a fully loaded train could carry a 
maximum of 588 fuel assemblies. The typical nuclear-powered submarine has two 
reactor cores containing between 248 and 252 fuel assemblies each. Each fuel assembly 
contains several tons of uranium packed fuel rods. Currently, less than four shipments a 
year are being conducted because the Northern Fleet lacks the funds to pay for the 
service. To reduce the current burden caused by the storage of nuclear material and to 
bring it down to a manageable level would require a minimum of ten trips to the Mayak 
facility.76 
75 Bradley, 285-287. 
76 Nilsen et al. 
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After the removal of the fuel assemblies, the primary circuit compartment, 
including the reactor tank, is separated from the submarine, which is cut up for scrap 
metal. The reactor compartments are then prepared for long-term storage or disposal. 
After the fuel has been removed from the reactor compartment of a 
nuclear submarine, about 100,000 Ci of induced radioactivity remains. 
About 99% of this is in the reactor vessel and adjacent metal structures, 
with only about 0.1% of the radioactivity accounted for by corrosion 
products spread through primary coolant circuit surfaces. During the first 
50-70 years, essentially all the radioactivity from the radiation standpoint 
is due to 60Co.77 
During this step of the process, various types of radioactive waste are generated. 
More than 95% of the contaminated material comes from the reactor, 
representing approximately 7% of the submarine volume. Usually, most 
of the LRW is drained from the reactor when the fuel assemblies are 
removed. The liquid waste from this operation amounts to 200 m3: 20 m3 
from the primary coolant circuit, 4 m3 from filters, and 170 m3 from 
biological shielding tanks in the reactor compartment. Flushing of the 
primary reactor cooling circuit produces about 100 m3 of liquid waste with 
an activity of up to 1 O2 Ci/l.. . . Long-lived isotopes, ranging fiom 270 to 
27,000 Ci in total, constitute about 90% of the radioactivity in the reactor 
compartment 3-5 years after the removal of reactor fueI.78 
There are three ways to prepare the reactor compartment for transport or long- 
term storage. 1) The submarine may be cut up in such a way as to leave an extra 
compartment fore and aft of the reactor compartment allowing it to float. 2) Only the 
reactor compartment may be removed, with pontoons fastened to it, allowing it to float. 
3) The reactor compartment may be filled with the buoyant substance polisterol, to keep 
it afloat.79 
~~ ~ 
77 Bradley, 29 1. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Nilsen et a1.1995. 
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Once the reactor compartment is prepared for transport or long-term storage, in 
Severodvinsk and Nerpa, it is towed to Sayda Bay where it is temporarily stored at 
various piers until a permanent location can be determined. Thus far, no decisions have 
been made as to where this facility will be. There has been some planning to use the 
submarine concealment tunnels at Ara Bay, but this would present extreme risks of 
radioactive leakage into the sea due to flooding. 
The challenges of the decommissioning and dismantlement process are enormous 
and expensive. There are no quick fixes and little financial support. 
E. CHALLENGES TO THE DISMANTLEMENT PROCESS 
The Northern Fleet faces serious challenges associated with the decommissioning 
and dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines. The challenges stem in large part 
from Russia's economic crises. These challenges involve financial, planning, and 
technical factors.80 
There is an ongoing conflict within the Russian Ministry of Defense regarding the 
allocation of the defense budget. The Defense Ministry leadership is continually cutting 
back on the allocations to the Navy. It is through navy funding that the dismantlement 
process is supported; and a lack of funds for the navy equates to a lack of funds for the 
dismantlement process. Army Generals, who have little interest in the needs of the Navy, 
have traditionally held the dominant leadership positions within the Ministry of Defense. 
Little ha3 changed with the transition of Soviet Russia to Russia. If anything, the 
8o Jill Tatko and Tamara Robinson, "Naval Nuclear Vessels Overview" 
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situation has worsened due to the economic struggles of the dominant nuclear branches, 
the Navy and the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF).81 
Russia’s SSBN force faces a grave dilemma. The Russian Navy is unable to 
properly maintain and secure its nuclear-powered submarine force, and the Russian 
military plans to transfer fifty percent of its strategic missiles to nuclear-powered 
submarines in late 2000. As it stands, three of the six strategic ballistic missile 
submarines, Typhoon class SSBNs, are in the poorest condition and incapable of 
remaining combat-ready due to a lack of funding. The other SSBN classes, Delta I11 and 
Delta IV, are experiencing similar difficulties. 
There are a nmber of reasons behind the lack of funds which are needed 
for repairing [and maintaining] operational strategic missile-carrying 
submarine cruisers and constructing new ones. Namely, it’s stated that 
investments of capital in the naval component of Russia’s strategic nuclear 
forces are three times less effective than those made in ground-based 
missile complexes.82 
There are three aggravating factors to this situation. First, the shipbuilding 
industries, which have significant influence with government authorities, are securing 
contracts for new construction, to the detriment of the ship repairing industry, which is 
responsible for repair and dismantlement. Second, the navy has little choice but to 
allocate the major portion of its budget to maintain operational vessels instead of 
spending funds on those destined for dismantlement. Third, navy and civilian personnel 
are not being paid for months at a time. This has led to incidents ranging from civilians 
g1 Kostev, 107. 
g2 Ibid., 108. 
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blocking access to naval facilities to naval officers stealing radioactive material from 
decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines.83 
By the end of 1998, it is estimated, only $500 million of the required $2.2 billion 
($1.4 billion for the Northern Fleet) had been allocated for the dismantlement process, 
including fuel and waste storage and tran~portation.8~ This price tag will grow 
exponentially as the cost of maintaining one decommissioned nuclear-powered 
submarine is approximately $200,000 per year, including a partial crew to oversee 
general maintenance and reactor operation. This equates to $26 million per year for 130 
submarines and does not include the costs of any environmental damage owing to 
inadequate radioactive waste storage.85 
The explanation for the lack of planning begins with the ambiguity over which 
agency has jurisdiction and responsibility for the dismantlement process. Additionally, 
no plan for addressing the dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines existed until 
1986. 
As a consequence, the agencies involved in the naval fuel cycle, 
radioactive waste handling and dismantlement are left without a cohesive 
and organized plan for the oversight of the dismantlement process. 
Responsibility for the decommissioning and dismantlement of nuclear- 
powered submarines falls in the hands of many agencies, including the 
Russian Navy, the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Ministry of Defense, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and 
Gosatomnadzor [the Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and 
Radiation Safety]. These agencies experience problems of coordination, 
83 Nilsen et al. 1995. 
84 Tamara C. Robinson, "Submarine Dismantlement and Material Storage Challenges for Russian 
Nuclear Propulsion," 9. 
85 Tamara C. Robinson, "Submarine Dismantlement and Material Storage Challenges for Russian 
Nuclear Propulsion," 9. 
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competition for control and for funds, and conflicts about interpreting the 
guidelines. In addition, ongoing military reform and complicated military 
engagements. . . distract the Russian military from tackling environmental 
problems and only exacerbate the complications of decommissioning and 
dismantlement .86 
Beginning in 1992, the Russian Navy had big plans to deal with the technical 
deficiencies concerning the decommissioning and dismantlement process, but nothing 
happened. According to Moltz and Robinson, the four major technical obstacles facing 
the Russian dismantlement process are: 
1) inadequate spent storage and transport capabilities; 2) problems with 
liquid radioactive waste storage and filtration; 3) the slow work pace of 
existing dismantlement lines; 4) the lack of facilities for the long-term 
storage of highly radioactive reactor compartments. The most serious 
obstacle Russia now faces is its inadequate storage and transport 
capabilities for submarine fuel.87 
For example, Andreeva Bay, the largest radioactive waste storage facility in the Northern 
Fleet, is reported to have in excess of 21,000 spent fuel rods. 
Although Kostev recognizes these technical obstacles, he would argue that the 
real challenges facing Russia in this regard are as follows: 
Protecting the crew and other people from radiation exposure in the 
process in [of] removing nuclear-powered submarines from the Navy, 
making sure that these ships keep afloat and preventing reactor accidents 
constitute the most acute, difficult and important task which the Russian 
Navy is facing today.88 
86 Jill Tatko and Tamara Robinson, "Decommissioning and Dismantlement Overview" 3. 
87 James Clay Mole and Tamara Robinson, "Dismantling Russia's Nuclear Subs: New Challenges to 
Non-Proliferation," Arms Control Today, June 1999. 12. 
88 Kostev, 50. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
The last forty years turned the Northern Fleet geographical area into a potential 
nuclear wasteland. During the Cold War, Soviet Russia built 245 nuclear-powered 
submarines. Post-Soviet Russia can not afford to maintain all these submarines. 
Moscow must now contend with this Cold War "fallout." Currently, ninety-six nuclear- 
powered submarines have been decommissioned. Of these ninety-six, seventy-eight have 
yet to be defueled. 
Russia acknowledges the political and environmental implications of the 
decommissioning and dismantlement process, but the current Russian economic crisis 
precludes it from doing little more then acknowledging the problem. Historically, Russia 
was able to dispose of its radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, and reactor cores by 
dumping them into the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, andor in coastal and land-based areas 
of the island of Novaya Zemlya. Consequently, all Russian nuclear storage facilities are 
full, and Russia is maintaining radioactive material in open-air storage. Although a 
"Chernobyl-like" incident could not occur with a single naval reactor, the piling up of 
spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste could trigger an uncontrolled chain reaction 
resulting in a nuclear explosion.89 
89 Kostev, 67-68. 
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IV. ENVIRONMENTAL AND NON-PROLIFERATION RISKS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With Russia's emergence as an independent state, following the collapse of the 
USSR in 1991 , came the public revelation of the nuclear risks associated with its policies 
and circumstances. The environmental and proliferation risks are particularly 
noteworthy. Soviet and Russian nuclear practices have produced hazards that are causing 
environmental damage to Russia and that could cause radioactive contamination and 
environmental damage to neighboring countries, as well as the Barents Sea, the Arctic 
Sea, the Kara Sea, the White Sea, and the Arctic Ocean.90 Additionally, current Russian 
arrangements may provide an environment conducive to nuclear proliferation. 
As Russia's economy continues to falter, these nuclear issues have become a great 
concern for its neighbors in the northern hemisphere. Indeed, the nuclear waste 
management crisis in the Northern Fleet has presented the Russian government with a 
dilemma that requires immediate answers and demands immediate action. 
Is it possible for the Russian Government to provide financial resources to 
secure nuclear waste in the remote areas in the far North, when even some 
high-ranking admirals claim they cannot guarantee a reliable early 
warning system for Russia's strategic forces? And will it be possible for 
the international community to provide financial and technical assistance 
to secure nuclear waste in Russia when Western experts are not allowed to 
inspect the "secret" nuclear waste storage facilities?g 1 
90 Thomas Nilsen, Igor Kudrick and Alexandr Nikitin, "The Russian Northern Fleet: Sources of 
Radioactive Contamination," Bellona Foundation 1995. Available [Online]:<http://w.bellona.no 
/e/russia hikitin /98 10 16-thn.htm. [09 November 19991. 
91 Nilsen et al. 1995. 
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The Northern Fleet’s submarine nuclear reactors generate a major source of the 
radioactive waste on the Kola Peninsula. In an attempt to manage this problem, the 
Northern Fleet utilizes six naval bases for storing solid and liquid radioactive wastes 
(SRW and LRW) and two bases with the facilities to store spent fuel assemblies. The 
Northern Fleet also employs technical service ships that have the capability of storing 
spent fuel assemblies, LRW and SRW. Additionally, the Kola Peninsula shipyards store 
considerable amounts of radioactive waste.92 Soviet and Russian practices in the 
management of radioactive waste have led to a nearly irreversible pattern of 
environmental damage and the potential for a radioactive catastrophe. 
The methods of storing radioactive waste in land-based storage facilities in the 
Northern Fleet have changed very little since the emergence of Russia in 1991. These 
methods and related practices are discussed in this chapter. One of the most significant 
Soviet practices was dumping radioactive waste at sea. 
B. HISTORICAL PRACTICES 
The Soviet Union began dumping radioactive waste in northern seas beginning 
with its first nuclear-powered submarine in 1959. The dumped waste originated from the 
operation and maintenance of nuclear-powered submarines, as well as civilian nuclear 
icebreakers. Russia, Soviet and post-Soviet, has dumped twice as much radioactive 
waste at sea as the twelve other nations that dump at sea combined. Soviet and Russian 
dumping has been done in shallow waters, north of the 50fh latitude, and on the 
continental shelf93 
92 Bradley, 24 1-242. 
93 Nilsen et al. 1995. 
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Since 1960, the Northern Fleet has consistently dumped radioactive waste into the 
Barents Sea and the Kara Sea. This has included solid and liquid radioactive waste as 
well as nuclear reactors, with and without fue1.94 According to Nilsen, "In all, Russia 
(former Soviet Union) has dumped between 115,000 TBq (3.1 million Ci) and 333,000 
TBq (9 million Ci) at sea. In comparison, all other countries put together have dumped 
46,000 TBq (1.24 million Ci) during the period of 1946 - 1982."95 
Since 1959, the liquid radioactive waste (LRW) dumped at sea has been a product 
of cooling water from submarine reactors and fuel assembly storage tanks. The last 
documented dumping of LRW occurred in November 1991; but this practice may be 
continuing, because no practical alternative methods of storage or disposal exist. 
According to regulations set forth by the Soviet Navy in 1968, the liquid 
radioactive waste should have a maximal concentration of radioactivity of 
370 Bq/l of long-life radioactive isotopes, and 1850 kBq/l of short-life 
isotopes. Whether these regulations are observed, is not known.96 
The highest concentrations of dumped LRW are located in three dumping fields in 
the northern portion of the Barents Sea, west of the island of Novaya Zemlya, while low- 







From 1959 up to 1991,3.7 Tbq (100 Ci) liquid radioactive waste has been 
dumped in the White Sea, 451 Tbq (12,171 Ci) in the Barents Sea, and 
315 Tbq (8,500 Ci) in the Kara Sea. 430 Tbq (11,600 Ci) radioactive 
water has leaked out in the sea following accidents concerning storage of 
fuel assemblies, submarines, and the civil nuclear icebreaker Lenin. The 
radioactivity of the liquid waste dumped in the Barents Sea, Kara Sea, and 
White Sea totals 880 Tbq (23,771 ( 3 . 9 8  
Since 1965, solid radioactive waste generated by the Northern Fleet, in containers 
and without conhe r s ,  has been dumped in eight different bays off the eastern coast of 
Novaya Zemlya and in the Kara Sea. Additionally, the Northern Fleet has sunk 
seventeen ships containing various types of radioactive waste of various levels of 
radioactivity in the Barents Sea and Kara Sea. Before these ships were sunk, the navy 
placed contaminated parts from submarine reactors, equipment used on the reactors, 
reactor sections, reactor cooling water pumps, reactor generators, and varying metal parts 
in them.99 
According to Nilsen, Kudrick, and Nikitin, 
a total of 6,508 containers of radioactive waste has been dumped directly 
in the Kara Sea. The Northern Fleet has dumped 4,641 of these. In 
archives of the Murmansk Shipping Company, dumping of 11,090 
containers into the sea has been recorded. This implies the company has 
dumped 1,867 individual containers, while the remaining 9,223 containers 
were placed aboard lighters and ships before they were sunk.100 
The radioactive waste containers hold from 0.5 to 1 m3 of radioactive waste, and 
are made of plain iron, with some lined with concrete.101 During the 1960’s, many of the 
~ 
9* %id. 
99 Nilsen et a1.1995. 
loo Ibid. 
lo* Bradley, 293. 
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dumped radioactive containers did not sink. Disposal crews machine-gunned the 
containers until they filled with water and sank, but not all their attempts were successful. 
Hence, there were numerous reports of floating waste containers in the Kara Sea and one 
report of a waste container found ashore. Placing rocks in the waste containers, along 
with the radioactive waste, to ensure that they would sink solved this problem. The 
majority of these incidents took place off the southeastern coast of Novaya Zemlya, in the 
Ambrosimov Bay.lo2 
Thirteen nuclear submarine reactors have been dumped in the Kara Sea, six of 
which had used nuclear fuel onboard. All these reactors were so badly damaged fiom 
serious accidents that the nuclear fuel was impossible to remove, due to the strong 
radiation. The threat of radiation damage prevented the removal of nuclear fuel before 
the reactor was dumped. In addition, three nuclear reactors fiom the icebreaker Lenin 
have been dumped. Some of these reactors had been in storage for less than a year when 
dumped, while others had been in storage for nearly fifteen years before they were 
dumped. Russian reactor engineers allege that five of the reactors were filled with a 
protective sealant of steel, cement, and polyester to prevent radioactive seep. These 
containers should last for up to 500 years.103 
America’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has estimated the 
radioactivity released by the three dumped Lenin reactors and the submarine reactors 
dumped with used fuel to be in the vicinity of 178 Pbq (4,800 Ci), and the remaining 
submarine reactors to be approximately 3.7 Pbq (100 Ci) per reactor. Russian officials 
lo2 Nilsen et al. 1995. 
lo3 Ibid. 
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calculate the release of radioactivity to be significantly lower-that is, a combined total 
85 Pbq (2,300 kCi) for all the reactors.104 
In 1992, the first of three NonvegianlRussian cooperative expeditions was 
launched to assess the measurements of radioactivity at the dump sites in the Kara Sea. 
The results were negligible, as the measurements were taken at locations distant fiom the 
actual dump sites. In 1993, the second expedition was granted permission to take 
measurements at actual dump site fjords, but was denied access to Ambrosimov Bay and 
Stepovov Bay, the largest solid radioactive waste dump sites. The third expedition in 
1994 was finally allowed to visit the Ambrosimov and Stepovov Bays. The expedition 
through these bays showed that barrels of low-level waste and intermediate-level waste 
were in "very bad shape,'' while the containers and submarine reactor compartments 
appeared to be intact. The Norwegian expedition leader, Lars Foyn, noted that there was 
almost no biological life in the fjords of Novaya Zemlya.105 
In Stepovov Bay, the expedition located radioactive waste dump sites that had 
never been reported. Photographs were taken of sunken barrels, containers, reactor 
compartments, and submarines. These items were in such poor condition that the remote- 
control radiation measuring device went through the rusty metal walls.106 
In Ambrosimov Bay, the expedition was able to locate the following: 
Barrels of low- and intermediate-level waste 
lo4 Estimate by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory quoted in Nilsen et al. 1995. 







Three barges full of liquid waste with large receptacles on the deck 
Several large cylindrical container receptacles on one of the barges 
Reactor compartments (with and without fuel). 
Other observations were noted as follows: 
0 
0 
Current contamination in the fjords is mostly caused by leaching from the 
containers; that from reactor compartments was small in comparison. 
Waste containers, submarine reactor compartments, and sunken barges 
were observed. The container walls were highly corroded and had holes 
in them. 
Not all of the solid waste types and locations as noted [in official 
documents] were able to be located, and several of the locations were 
imprecise. 




Subsequent expeditions have been made to various dump sites in the Barents Sea 
and the Kara Sea to test the level of radioactivity, but as of 2000 the results had 
apparently not been published. 
In 1972, the Soviet Union signed the London Convention, limiting the dumping of 
radioactive waste at sea by ships. The Soviet Union ratified the London Convention in 
1975, but continued the dumping of LRW and SRW. The USSR also dumped nuclear 
submarine reactors containing fuel in the Kara Sea in 1981 and 1988.108 *'Although the 
Navy stopped dumping LRW in the northern seas in 1986, large amounts of waste remain 
stored on vessels specially designed for dumping at sea."109 In July 1988, Soviet 
authorities claimed that Soviet law prohibited dumping radioactive waste at sea. 
Addition'ally, Moscow claimed that the Soviet Union had never dumped radioactive 
Io7 Bradley, 296. 
lo8 Nilsen et a1.1995. 
lo9 Jill Tatko and Tamara Robinson, "Northern Fleet Overview." 
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waste at sea. Less than a month later, the Northern Fleet dumped two submarine reactors 
containing fuel in the Kara Sea.110 According to Georgi Kostev, Soviet-style practices 
have continued: 
At the present moment the Russian Navy is not ready to discontinue sea 
dumping of liquid radioactive waste, for the coastal reprocessing 
enterprises have not yet been brought into operation. It happened because 
the fleets do not have regional schemes of radioactive waste disposal 
which would envisage special technological operations with radioactive 
waste, from the moment of producing till the moment of burying it.111 
C. CURRENT PRACTICES 
Russia’s radioactive waste management practices and doctrines are similar to 
those of the Soviet Union. Although nuclear waste dumping at sea may have tapered off 
or even ceased in some areas, inadequate nuclear waste storage practices continue. The 
nuclear submarine dismantlement process has exacerbated the situation. Although other 
variables contribute to Russia’s inability to improve the nuclear submarine dismantlement 
process, arrangements for storing nuclear waste safely and efficiently are nearly 
nonexistent. 
Although the Northern Fleet utilizes six bases and two shipyards for the storage of 
its liquid and solid radioactive waste, all of which have serious shortcomings, this chapter 
concentrates on the crisis at Andreeva Bay. Almost all of the other storage facilities face 
similar crises, to a lesser or greater degree. 
lo Nilsen et al. 1995. 
Kostev, 101. 
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Located on the Kola Peninsula, 45 miles from the Norwegian border, Andreeva 
Bay is the Northern Fleet's main storage facility for nuclear waste. The base is the only 
Northern Fleet facility for the storage of spent nuclear fuel from nuclear submarines. 
Andreeva Bay houses over 21,000 spent fuel elements, stored in three concrete 
tanks of poor condition. Since 1990, these tanks have been filled to capacity. Hence, 
open-air storage has been utilized. To relieve the crowded situation at Andreeva Bay, 
spent nuclear fuel was shipped to the Mayak reprocessing facility until 1996. In 1997, 
this transportation ceased completely. 112 However, at least five trains made the trip from 
Murmansk to Mayak in 1999 and the first train of 2000 arrived on 4 January.113 During 
1997, all the nuclear waste containers shipped to Andreeva Bay from the various 
dismantlement facilities were stored outside, in open fields, without any protection. Each 
container holds approximately 35 spent fuel elements with an enrichment of 40 percent. 
These containers are unsecured, in violation of international as well as Russian 
regulations for the handling of nuclear waste.114 According to Georgi Kostev, 
Monitoring the process of fissionable materials piling up is another 
pressing problem, which is probably the most important one. This is 
especially true of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Storing them in bulk 
without any control, piling up of their quantity and mass could result in the 
most dreadful disaster - in [the] triggering of an uncontrolled chain 
reaction, in other words, a nuclear explosion.115 
Nilsen et al. 1995. 
l3 Chuen, Monterey Institute of International Studies, interview by author, 13 March 2000. 
114 Nilsen et a1.1995. 
l5 Kostev, 67. 
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The solid radioactive waste at Andreeva Bay is stored less than 200 m from the 
sea, with 50 percent in concrete bunkers and the rest in an open air array outside the 
bunker. The liquid radioactive waste is stored in five underground tanks of 400m3 
each. 1 16 
Building 5, the first storage facility of its kind, is located at Andreeva Bay. 
Building 5 houses spent nuclear fuel and constitutes a significant example of the crisis 
facing the Kola Peninsula. Built in 1962 and expanded in 1973, building 5 consists of 
two rectangular pools, made of concrete and lined with steel plates. These pools are 60 m 
long, 3 m wide, and 6 m deep with a volume of nearly 1,000 m3. They were originally 
designed to house 550 containers of nuclear material, but in 1973 that capacity increased 
to 2,550 containers. That corresponds to enough fuel assemblies for 50 to 76 nuclear 
reactors. 1 17 
The earliest documented problem with this facility occurred in February 1982, 
when water penetrated the stored containers and thereby facilitated the release of 
radioactivity. By April 1982, it was assessed that water was leaking at a rate of 100 liters 
a day, with radioactivity of .0003 CiA. By September 1982, the leak seepage was 
assessed at 30 metric tons of water per day. As work was being performed on the first 
pool, another leak developed in the second pool; and this resulted in seepage at a rate of 
10 metric tons per day. In February 1983, building 5 was deemed unusable. It is 
estimated that approximately 3,000 m3 of water with radioactivity of nearly 3,000 Ci 
leaked from both storage pools. Today building 5 is inoperative and in disrepair. There 
116 Bradley, 245. 
hid.  
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has been no attempt to clean up the building and the equipment it contains due to the 
gamma radiation rates of 40 Rhr.118 
The containers that were removed because of the leak were stored in three of the 
tanks designed for LRW. Since 1995, these tanks have been full. Since 1984, there have 
been plans for new storage facilities at Andreeva Bay, but none of these plans has been 
implemented. 1 19 The dismantlement cannot continue without proper storage for spent 
fuel assemblies. 
The open-air storage arrangement at Andreeva Bay originally consisted of 52 
containers of spent fuel assemblies. 20 have been sent to the Mayak facility over the 
years, but 32 containers with nearly 220 fuel assemblies remain. These 32 containers 
have been in place and exposed to the elements since 1962. Hence, the containers are 
corroded and cracked; and water is making contact with fuel elements. Under these 
conditions, the containers cannot be handled or moved for reprocessing.120 
Despite these conditions, other facilities throughout the Kola Peninsula, 
experiencing the same difficulties with the dismantlement process and limited nuclear 
waste storage, are sending their excess radioactive waste materials to Andreeva Bay. 
Given the existing conditions among Russia's Northern Fleet facilities, one must 
consider the potential for a nuclear catastrophe. While there is considerable risk of 
further environmental damage at these storage facilities, the greater risk of a nuclear 
l8 Bradley, 246. 
119 Bradley, 247. 
120 Bradley, 247. 
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accident lies with the decommissioned nuclear submarines awaiting dismantlement. 
According to Kostev, 
about 150 written-off submarines will have to be utilized within the stated 
period. This implies that the number of poorly controlled sources of 
radioactivity and the amount of radioactive waste will grow, and the risk 
of environmental pollution in the regions where decommissioned nuclear- 
powered submarines are stored will also increase.121 
Kostev's observation raises the key question at issue in this thesis: Are the 
variables in place that could lead to another "Chernobyl"? 
D. THE POTENTIAL 
It is difficult for outsiders to assess the potential for a Russian nuclear submarine 
reactor disaster, because the detailed design of Russian naval reactors is classified. 
Hence, the estimates of the destructive consequences of a critical accident discussed in 
this thesis are largely based on assumptions. To qualify and validate these assumptions, 
available information about the reactor from the nuclear icebreaker Sevmorput is utilized. 
This reactor presumably has characteristics similar to those of a Russian naval reactor. 
Like almost all of Russia's nuclear-powered submarine reactors, the Sevmorput 's reactor 
is water-pressurized. 122 
The technical condition of submarines awaiting dismantlement is steadily 
deteriorating. The Russians have taken numerous temporary safety measures to keep the 
submarines fiom sinking. These measures include "constant pumping of compressed air 
121 Kostev, 124. 
22 NATO, Environmental Risk Assessment for Two Defence-Related Problems: Non-DeJiteled, 
Decommissioned Nuclear Submarines. Report No. 227, March 1998. 66. 
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into the hulls, welding of bottom seacocks and periodic docking.”123 These efforts are 
intended to minimize the possibility of a spontaneous chain reaction in the reactor’s 
nuclear fuel due to contact with seawater. However, these measures do not eliminate the 
risks of radioactive leaks. Additionally, if the reactor coolant freezes during the winter, 
this may cause damage to the fuel assemblies, and thereby increase the risk of an accident 
when the assemblies are later removed. 124 
The safety measures that have been applied hardly include monitoring the 
condition of the nuclear fuel in the reactor. Hence, it cannot be discounted 
that accidents or leaks of radioactivity could occ ur.... The reactors 
themselves [in submarines awaiting dismantlement] are in markedly worse 
condition than those on operational vessels, for there is more humidity and 
variations in the temperature as well as the risk of seawater entering the 
hu11.125 
A constant concern with nuclear submarines awaiting dismantlement is the 
different supplies of power used for maintaining the various reactors. For example, first 
generation submarines use either batteries or diesel power, and both produce direct 
current (DC). Conversely, second-generation submarines use turbo generators of 
alternating current (AC), and batteries and diesel power as an auxiliary power supply.126 
This approach could lead to a problem as the main control panel of the reactor plant is 
usually removed upon decommissioning127 and the partial crew is usually not well 
trained. 
123 Nilsen et al. 1995. 
124 Nilsen et a1.1995. 
125 Nilsen et al. 1995. 
126 NATO, 21-22. 
127 Ibid.,27. 
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The crewmembers often lack the necessary training or are assigned to a 
laid-up submarine either because they are lacking in competence or are 
unfit to serve on an active vessel. Thus the lack of competent, qualified 
personnel increases the possibility of emergency procedures not being 
executed correctly in the event of a serious incident.128 
Under ideal conditions, the internal events that could result in a critical accident 
are generally not a concern in decommissioned submarines. If, however, one of these 
events occurs, especially loss-of-coolant, flooding or sinking, a release of radioactivity 
will probably follow. Internal events are categorized as follows: 
0 Critical accidents 
0 Primary heat transport system failure 
0 Loss-of-coolant events 
0 Loss-of-coolant flow events 
0 Fuel channel blockage 
Secondary heat transport system failure 0 
0 Cooling-water system failure 
0 Electric system failure 
0 Instrument air system failures 
0 Hydraulic oil system failures 
0 Flooding 
0 Fires and explosions 
0 SinkingQ9 
The Kurchhatov Institute report considers the probabilities and consequences of 
three other types of dangerous accidents: 
0 Overheating of fuel elements due to a lack of cooling caused by an 
accidental loss of coolant in the primary circuit of the reactor. 
0 Spontaneous chain reaction (SCR or criticality) in a nuclear core of the 
reactor due to an unauthorized manipulation of the reactor control 
mechanisms or due to personnel mistakes or equipment malfunctions 
during spent nuclear fuel (SNF) removal from the reactor. 
12* Nilsen et al. 1995. 
129 NATO, 42. 
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0 Accidental sinking of a nuclear submarine with spent nuclear fuel 
onboard. 130 
It must be emphasized that these events are generally not a concern for 
decommissioned submarines as long as rules and regulations are followed.131 But, as 
noted above, the crews manning these submarines are not all that competent, and they are 
coping with poor economic and social conditions. 
The greatest potential for a critical accident resides in an external event, a 
spontaneous chain reaction during reactor defueling of a decommissioned submarine. As 
previously mentioned, there are 110 to 11 5 decommissioned submarines, with fuel still 
onboard, awaiting dismantlement. According to the Kurchatov Institute, 
[The] Northern Fleet needs to fulfill 44  such defueling operations with FG 
[First Generation] submarines. The product of assessed SCR [spontaneous 
chain reaction] probability by expected number of defuelings is about 0.1. 
This total probability of SCR accident looks too high.132 
Considering all the various problems that have been identified with the Northern 
Fleet, what would a nuclear accident imply? The "worst case'' scenario must be 
considered. This scenario would probably involve a severe defuelling accident with one 
of the decommissioned submarines. 
A severe defuelling accident could give rise to a steam explosion, followed by a 
release of radioactivity into the atmosphere. The heat of this explosion would cause a 
radioactive plume to rise, and the height of the plume and other factors (such as weather) 
130 V.S Ustinov, A.P. Zotov et al., "Nuclear Safety Assessment of Stored Afloat Non-Defbelled 
Decommissioned Nuclear Submarines'' Final Report], Kurchatov Institute, MOSCOW, July 1997.20. 
131 NATO, 27 
132 V.S Ustinov, A.P. Zotov et al., 20. 
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would determine how extensive the radioactive release would be. The probable height of 
this type of accident is assessed to be 50 to 100 m. The Chernobyl accident's plume 
ranged between 200 and 1200 m, but this was greatly enhanced by the persistent graphite 
fxe.133 
The radioactive elements released by this accident would probably be similar to 
those at Chernobyl, including I3'Cs, "Sr, and 239Pu. The distance these pollutants would 
travel would depend on the characteristics of the plume, the wind, and the weather.134 It 
should be noted that the possible accumulation of radioactive nuclides from the fuel in a 
nuclear submarine reactor might be 10 to 20 times less than that at Chernobyl, primarily 
because the increased temperature of a submarine reactor would probably last only a 
short time.135 
In the model used by the NATO pilot study to evaluate the probabilities involved 
in a severe nuclear accident, the accident would hypothetically occw at Ara Bay. Two 
approaches using "real-time" calculations were evaluated, the probabilistic approach and 
the "plausible worst-case" approach. I36 
The probabilistic approach suggests that 80 percent of the released radioactivity 
would fall on Russian territory andor in the Barents Sea. This would affect almost all of 
133 NATO, 81. 
134 Ibid., 80-81. 
135 V.S Ustinov, A.P. Zotov et al., 32. 
136 NATO, 82-83. 
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the population on the Kola Peninsula. The remaining 20 percent would likely drift toward 
the Norwegian border. 137 
The "plausible worst-case" approach suggests that the majority of the released 
The level of radioactivity would head towards Norway, Finland, and Sweden. 
precipitation would have an extreme effect, a factor of 100 to 1000 times, on the amount 
of deposited contamination. This could create hot spots in the plume's track.138 
As a result, rainfall during cloud passage may lead to contamination rates 
comparable to the situation in the middle of Sweden following the 
Chernobyl accident, but the affected area will be much smaller.139 
It should be noted, especially in the Nordic area, that the actual radioactive dose rate 
would be dependent on the seasonal effects at the time of the accident, such as snow 
cover and the grazing of animals. The NATO study assessed that 30 percent of the local 
food products would be contaminated.140 
One must keep in mind that the scenario above would result from one reactor 
accident, while there are over 100 submarine reactors awaiting dismantlement. 
Additionally, consideration must be given, in the scenarios posited in both approaches, to 
the environmental and health consequences discussed in Chapter 11. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Moscow's practices, during the Soviet period and subsequently, have presented 
Russia and the rest of the world with a serious dilemma. Russia's insufficient ability to 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid., 84. 
139 Ibid. 
I4O Ibid., 85. 
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safely store nuclear waste and effectively process spent nuclear fuel assemblies has 
created a bottleneck of decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines awaiting 
dismantlement. This situation has furnished the basis for nuclear accidents which could 
inflict serious environmental damage. According to a NATO study, 
The handling of decommissioned submarines in general and the defuelling 
of their reactors in particular are difficult and potentially dangerous tasks 
that require well-defined rules and procedures as well as well-educated 
and motivated personnel. Accidents and incidents that have taken place 
over the years have led to some concern about the current adherence to 
safety standards and the safety culture among the personnel who perform 
these tasks. A deeply embedded safety culture is crucial to the successful 
decommissioning of nuclear submarines. 
With the political and economic conditions in Russia, there is probably no way for 
the Russian government to effectively deal with the dismantlement crisis without the aid 
and support of foreign governments and organizations. These entities cannot, however, 
begin to formalize the necessary aid packages until the Russian government lowers its 
cloak of secrecy and allows participating governments and agencies to assess the 
situation. This crisis was exacerbated in July 1999 when Vladimir Putin, then head of the 
FSB, the domestic security agency that succeeded the Soviet-era KGB, declared that 
environmental organizations are being used as fronts for Western spy agencies. Mr. 
Putin stated that "environmentalists will always be the focus of our attention."142 
NATO, 90. 
142 Putin quoted in Dan Gardner, "Environmentalists denounced as western spies," Ottawa Citizen, 24 July 
1999.2. 
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F. PROLIFERATION RISKS 
The Northern Fleet's situation could also increase proliferation risks. The 
underlying shortcomings of the Russian nuclear submarine dismantlement process could 
fuel a proliferation crisis. Three proliferation risks are particularly noteworthy: diversion, 
terrorism, and capitalism. 
The theft or diversion of naval reactor fuel is probably the most serious of the 
three risks. There are at least two documented cases of nuclear fuel theft in the Northern 
Fleet and numerous other reports in the Pacific Fleet. 
In July 1993, "a guard and a sailor absconded with 1.8 kg of 36% HEU (two fresh 
fuel rods) from Andreeva Bay, a fuel and radioactive waste storage site located at 
Zapadnaya Lista Naval Base near M~umansk."1~3 The two individuals were 
apprehended, with the fuel rods, by Russian security officers a short distance from the 
base. The guard and the sailor were subsequently sentenced to prison for four and five 
years respectively. This imprisonment was ordered despite claims that they were 
following orders from two senior naval officers.144 
In November 1993, two naval officers diverted 4.5 kg of 20 percent HEU 
(equivalent to three fresh fuel rods), at the Sevmorput shipyard, located near Murmansk. 
The theft was discovered only because a door to the storage facility was left open. 
143 James Clay Moltz and Tamara C. Robinson, "Dangerous Delays in Russian Nuclear Submarine 
Dismantlement," Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1999.4. 
144 %id. 
"Authorities arrested the two officers after a brother of one of the perpetrators, also an 
officer at Sevmorput, started asking around for potential buyers."145 
Since 1994, four additional cases of theft or diversion have been reported, but the 
outcomes of these cases remain unclear. Additionally, Gosatomadzor [the Russian 
Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety] reports at least nine cases of 
discrepancies between the listed inventory of nuclear fuel and the actual amount of fuel at 
the storage sites. Although an additional step in reprocessing is required to make 
weapons grade plutonium out of spent fuel, there are serious concerns about the lapses in 
nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Currently, Russia has no 
central MPC&A system. 146 
These cases suggest a considerable black market interest in naval fuel. 
Several of the incidents are consistent with the "insider theory", which 
posits that facility personnel are just as likely, if not more likely, to be the 
perpetrators of diversions as outsiders. They know where the material is 
stored, what kinds of physical protection measures are in place, and how 
to get around them.147 
Terrorism, on the other hand, is indifferent to the insider or the outsider. A 
terrorist could board a poorly guarded decommissioned submarine. Physical protection 
of these vessels is difficult. One of the perimeters is water, and personnel shortages have 
reduced the number of guards protecting some of these vessels to one. These 
circumstances increase the terrorist opportunity for attack.148 
14* Ibid.,5. 
146 Moltz and Robinson, "Dangerous Delays in Russian Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement," 5.  
147 Ibid., 6. 
148 Ibid., 7. 
58 
One particular incident demonstrates Russia's vulnerability to an "insider" 
terrorist attack. In September 1998, 
A young Russian sailor commandeered an active duty Akula-class SSN 
that was docked at the Gadzhiyevo Naval Base, killing eight of his 
colleagues in the process. He barricaded himself in the submarine's 
torpedo room, where he was preparing to set fire to the submarine and 
detonate its torpedoes .... When Federal Security Forces (FSB) troops 
stormed the torpedo compartment, they found the assailant dead, evidently 
fiom a smaller accidental explosion while preparing the torpedo 
"bonfire."149 
Had the sailor been successful, adjacent submarines might have also been 
destroyed, releasing ever greater amounts of dangerous nuclear material into the 
atmosphere and the water.150 
If this type of incident is possible on an active duty nuclear submarine, the 
potential for a terrorist attack at poorly guarded and poorly protected nuclear waste 
storage facilities and on decommissioned submarines with fuel on board must be 
significantly greater. 
Finally, there is capitalism. If the Russian government lacks the ability to make 
progress in dismantling decommissioned submarines and economically cannot afford to 
provide adequate protection and storage for these' submarines and their associated 
materials, why not sell them rather than scrap them? In fact, there is Russian interest in 
this option. 
In 1999, India expressed interest in purchasing decommissioned nuclear 
submarines, as they were considerably cheaper than incomplete new submarines. 
149 Mole and Robinson, "Dangerous Delays in Russian Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement," 7. 
Ibid., 8. 
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This interest began in the 1980s, when India leased a Russian nuclear submarine for two 
years. 15 1 
Sales of second-hand [nuclear submarine] vessels could set the stage for 
possible transfer to other interested parties, such as India's rival Pakistan, 
North Korea, South Korea, and possibly states in the Middle East.152 
The revenue from submarine sales and ship repair contracts and the relief in the 
dismantlement process might furnish incentives for the Russian government to reactivate 
and sell these vessels. "Under a loophole in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Russia could provide HEU fuel for these submarines outside of 
the IAEA safeguards."l53 As Moltz and Robinson point out, 
The threat of dozens of cut-rate Russian submarines cruising the world's 
oceans under other flags is an unsettling one for military, proliferation- 
related, and environmental reasons. 
Although Russian determination and exports might resolve a fraction of the 
nuclear submarine dismantlement problem, significant external assistance will be 
necessary to address the problem sufficiently. 
Moltz and Robinson, "Dangerous Delays in Russian Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement," 9. ' 
152 hid. 
153 Ibid., 9-10. 
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V. EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIAN DISMANTLEMENT 
EFFORTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The estimated cost of Russia's nuclear submarine dismantlement program, for the 
Northern Fleet alone, is approaching two billion dollars. The Russian government, 
however, has only provided a quarter of that sum. By the end of 1998, an estimated $500 
million had been allocated.155 
Foreign assistance totaled nearly $30 million in 1998, and was expected to 
increase to $50 to $60 million in 1999. (Precise information on current foreign assistance 
is not available at this writing.) But the average cost of dismantling one Russian nuclear 
submarine runs from about $7 million to $10 million. The sale of scrap metal from the 
submarine recoups only 20 percent to 30 percent of the dismantlement costs.156 
According to Moltz and Robinson, the goal of the Russian government is the elimination 
of all currently dismantled submarines by 2005. To achieve this, the Russian government 
plan holds, the Russian federal budget will cover thirty to forty percent of the cost, 
reusable materials will cover twenty to thirty percent of the cost, and the remaining cost 
will be covered by international assistance. However, Russia's ability to fund the 
program as estimated remains questionable. 157 
~~ ~ 
155 Moltz and Robinson, "Dismantling Russia's Nuclear Subs: New Challenges to Non-Proliferation," 13. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Moltz and Robinson, "Dismantling Russia's Nuclear Subs: New Challenges to Non-Proliferation," 13. 
61 
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States and other 
Western nations have provided financial assistance to the Russian government to help 
with the dismantlement process. However, the majority of this assistance has been for 
the dismantlement of Russia's SSBNs, particularly the removal of the missiles and the 
destruction of the missile tubes. No assistance has been given for the dismantlement of 
the reactors on the SSBNs, nor is there any program to address any portion of the 
dismantlement of the SSN force, which is the predominant environmental concern in the 
Northern Fleet. According to Russian Admiral Yurasov, Head of the Navy's Nuclear 
Safety Inspectorate for Nuclear Installations, the latter issues are currently in the working 
group stage.158 
B. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
With its economic and political problems, Russia has become dependent upon 
foreign assistance to maintain its nuclear submarine dismantlement program. The United 
States has provided the greatest amount of assistance, while Norway, the European 
Union, and a few other countries and institutions have provided assistance for related 
programs.159 Norway and the other Scandinavian countries are predominantly concerned 
with the environmental issues associated with the Northern Fleet's dismantlement 
program, while the United States is more interested in the strategic concerns of promoting 
SSBN dismantlement and preventing nuclear proliferation. 160 
158 Admiral Yurasov was a guest speaker at a symposium addressing dismantlement issues held at the 
Monterey Institute for International Studies on 12 December 1999. 
159 Moltz and Robinson, "Dismantling Russia's Nuclear Subs: New Challenges to Non-Proliferation," 13. 
160 James Clay Moltz, "Naval Fuel Cycle Foreign Assistance Overview," September 1999, Available 
[Online]:~http://www.cns.miis.edu/db/nisprofs/~ssi~nava~for~s~for~o~.h~. [ 10 January 19991. 
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1. The United States 
The two U.S. programs fall under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) Program, administered by the Department of Defense @OD), and the Material 
Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Task Force, administered by the 
Department of Energy (DOE). Both programs were developed to reduce "the threat of 
leakage of weapons of mass destruction and their technologies ftom the former Soviet 
Union. I' 161 
Early U.S. programs offered assistance for missile and warhead 
dismantlement and provided technology to three shipyards to assist in 
SSBN dismantlement. It must be kept in mind that Russian shipyards had 
not previously engaged in submarine dismantlement and were therefore 
learning fiom scratch from U.S. contractors, some of which had no 
experience in nuclear submarine dismantlement work either. The U.S 
Navy provided only tacit support for the program, although later the U.S. 
Navy Sea Systems Command did allow Russian Navy and shipyard 
representatives to visit the main U.S. submarine dismantlement facility.162 
Originally, CTR focused its submarine efforts on the dismantlement of the 
ballistic missile launchers (that is, the SSBNs) and the dissemination of dismantlement 
technology to the three shipyards designated by the START I treaty for dismantling 
SSBNs. Two of the three facilities are located in the Northern Fleet, Nerpa (Murmansk) 
and Zvezdochka (Serverodvinsk). This technology included nearly $7 million worth of 
baler shears, oxyacetylene torches, cranes, protective equipment, and other instruments 
used in the dismantling of nuclear submarines.163 
Moltz and Robinson, "Dismantling Russia's Nuclear Subs: New Challenges to Non-Proliferation," 13. 
162 James Clay Moltz, "Assessing U.S. Assistance Programs for Submarine Dismantlement and the Naval 
Fuel Cycle," (Discussion paper prepared for a conference in Monterey California, 12 December 1999) 
Monterey Institute for International Studies, 4. 
163 bid.  
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Although some U.S. equipment was now in place to propel the dismantlement 
program, CTR faced the problem of striking shipyard workers who now had equipment, 
but were not being paid. According to Alexei Arbatov, given the needs of impoverished 
shipyard workers, 'Ithe beautiful U.S equipment did not bring them any happiness."164 
One shipyard worker stated, 
We will arrange another Chernobyl ...y ou will get the second Chernobyl 
here in the North. More frightening than the first one. Do remember, we 
have nuclear-powered subs on our hands.165 
Hence, CTR undertook a major program review that would eventually lead to a 
program to provide direct contracts to shipyards for dismantlement work on a 
"deliverables" basis. This would provide funds for work completed, much like that of 
U.S. contractors. Under this new program, shipyards have been able to pay their workers 
after years of layoffs and decline. 166 
The MPC&A Program focuses its efforts on better ways to assist Russia in 
protecting weapons grade nuclear materials, including fresh naval fuel. There have been 
some delays, however, because of spent fuel problems. As previously mentioned, most 
of the decommissioned nuclear submarines have not been defueled and cannot be 
defueled due to the lack of storage space. Because the MPC&A Program was originally 
chartered to furnish technical and financial assistance for the protection and 
~~ 
164 Arbatov quoted in ibid. 
165 Igor Kudrick, "We will arrange another Chemobyl," Bellona foundation 1997. Available 
[Online]:<http://www.bellona.no/e/russidnfl/news/97 1 109-2.htm. 
Moltz, "Assessing U.S. Assistance Programs for Submarine Dismantlement and the Naval Fuel Cycle," 
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accountability of fresh naval fuel to avoid possible diversion, it was unable to deal with 
the issue of spent fuel storage. As Tamara Robinson has observed, 
Since spent fuel is less of a proliferation threat, it has not received as much 
attention fiom a storage prospective, and has become a limitation in the 
current U.S. approach. This limitation and lack of foresight has caused 
delays in implementing the programs that do fulfill direct U.S. objectives, 
such as [nuclear] submarine dismantlement.167 
There has' been some progress in regard to these storage issues. DOE has been 
working with Russian officials to complete a new storage facility for highly enriched 
uranium (HEU), site 49 on the Kola Peninsula near Severodmorsk, as well as 
improvements to the PM-12 and PM-63 ships used for storage of nuclear material. 
It should be noted that neither of these programs is concerned with the 
environmental issues associated with the backlog of decommissioned Russian SSNs, 
even though the Russian government, recognizing the environmental risks of the SSNs 
and its own inability to dismantle them, has requested U.S. assistance to address the 
problem. Accordingly, U.S. equipment left from the SSBN dismantlement should 
arguably be used for continued SSN dismantlement, but the U.S. National Defense 
Authorization Act, Public Law 104-201 of 23 September 1996, states that CTR funds 
may not be expended or obligated to provide "assistance to promote environmental 
restoration."168 Likewise, the DOE MPC&A projects apparently fall under similar 
guidelines. The reason why U.S. legislation regarding CTR assistance programs 
expresses little interest in the dismantlement of Russian SSNs and their threat to the 
167 Robinson, "Submarine Dismantlement and Material Storage Challenges for Russian Nuclear 
Propulsion," 13. 
'68 FY97 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 104-201, Title XV, Sec. 1503, 23 September 
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environment may be the lack of strategic concern. This would support the astute 
observation of Clay Moltz: 
To date, SSN dismantlement has been treated as largely an 
"environmental" issue, not one of strategic concern due to the absence of 
strategic missiles on these vessels. However, SSNs can be fitted with 
nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and torpedoes, as well as housing two 
reactors with HEU fuel, making them a proliferation threat as well as an 
object of possible terrorism.169 
2. Norway 
Because of its concerns about nuclear safety and radioactive waste contamination, 
the Norwegian government has contributed nearly $30 million in assistance to the 
Russian nuclear submarine dismantlement program. Norway's assistance package is 
designed to address four priority areas: submarine dismantlement, material storage 
problems, weapons-related contamination, and spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management. Norway also plans to assist in the construction and improvement of spent 
fuel rail cars and spent fuel transport vessels. (This project is currently being assessed by 
the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) Program.)170 
Additionally, Norway is participating in a trilateral project with the United States 
and Russia to construct adequate treatment facilities to handle the increased amounts of 
LRW from decommissioned nuclear submarines. 171 
169 Moltz, "Assessing U.S. Assistance Programs for Submarine Dismantlement and the Naval Fuel Cycle," 
8. 
I7O Robinson, "Submarine Dismantlement and Material Storage Challenges for Russian Nuclear 
Propulsion," 15. 
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3. European Union (EU) Countries 
The Finnish government had contributed $700,000 to a Finnish company to treat 
liquid radioactive waste (LRW) fiom the Northern Fleet icebreakers, but discontinued 
further funding for similar projects, designed to treat the LRW of Russian nuclear 
submarines, when it was discovered that these funds were being used by Moscow to 
support Northern Fleet military vessels.172 
The United Kingdom has committed nearly $5 million to improve Russia's 
capability to safely handle radioactive waste resulting fiom the dismantlement process. 
Most of this aid addresses the removal of spent fuel rods fiom the service ship Lepse. 
The United Kingdom is also involved in an international consortium with the 
governments of Sweden, France, and Russia to develop an interim storage facility for 
spent naval fuel at the processing plant in Mayak. 173 
The condition of the service vessel Lepse, which contains seriously damaged fuel 
elements, is of particular concern for those addressing the Northern Fleet crisis. 
This multilateral project, involving Norway, the US, France, and the 
European Union, aims at removing the damaged fuel elements and 
improving the safety of the Lepse. The first stage of this project will cost 
$9 million, which is being split among the parties. This work is part of the 
long-term cooperative efforts planned by the Euro-Arctic Barents Council, 
which includes Norway, Sweden (an EU member), and Russia, among 
other parties, in cooperation with the United States and France. France, 
Norway, and the EU are also involved in other cooperative assistance 
outside the submarine field. One project is aimed at the shutdown of two 
unsafe, WER-440 civilian reactors operating on the Kola Peninsula. 174 
~ 
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Lastly, a consortium of companies from Sweden, the United Kingdom, France, 
Norway, and Russia has agreed to design two modem storage facilities at Mayak to store 
spent fuel generated by the dismantlement of nuclear submarines in the Northern Fleet. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The downward spiral of Russia's economy and political system as well as a 
complete lack of foresight have created a nuclear "nightmare" on the Kola Peninsula. 
Although extensive external assistance has been provided to the Russian government to 
aid in the nuclear submarine dismantlement program, the process still proceeds at a 
snail's pace. The causes of this slow pace include "mutual mistrust, the absence of 
liability agreements and Russian denial of access to certain facilities."175 
According to Clay Moltz and Tamara Robinson, 
The greatest need in Russia today is for Russia to develop a cradle-to- 
grave system for submarine dismantlement that provides for integrated 
processing of submarines through the combined efforts of several 
facilities. Russia's huge size will likely require parallel dismantlement 
processes to accommodate both the Northern and Pacific Fleets, rather 
than making use of a single dismantlement facility. 176 
Russia's lack of interest in the environmental issues related to the dismantlement 
of Northern Fleet nuclear submarines should be a matter of grave concern for the United 
States and other nations. The Chernobyl case study clearly indicates what could happen 
if the dismantlement program is not carried out with appropriate safety and 
environmental precautions. It appears that a political "band-aid" has been placed on 
environmental issues while a political "tourniquet" has been applied to issues that are 
175 Moltz and Robinson, "Dismantling Russia's Nuclear Subs: New Challenges to Non-Proliferation," 14. 
176 Ibid.,lS. 
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perceived as being of greater strategic importance. This attitude is evident in the views 
attributed to Vice Admiral Nikolai Birillo, the Russian Admiral in charge of the 
committee to dismantle nuclear submarines. According to the Associated Press, "Vice 
Adm. Nikolai Birillo was trained to end the world, not clean it up."177 
177 Associated Press dispatch, "West Helps Dismantle Russia Subs," 10 November 1999. 
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Unit of radioactivity, measured in terms of the rate of radioactive 
decay, e ueling the quantity of radioactive material that undergoes 
3.7 x 10 spontaneous nuclear transitions per second. Also equals 
the activity of one gram of radium-226. 
% 
Becquerel (Bq) The International Systam of Units (SI) derived unit of 
activity. One Bq is activity of a radionuclide decaying at 
thr rate of one spontaneous nuclear transition per second. 




The International System of Units (SI) derived unit of 
absorbed dose. One Gy equals the energy per unit mass 
imparted to matter by ionizing radiation of one joule per 
kilogram. 1 Gy = 100 rad. 
Unit of absorbed dose corresponding to the absorption of 
100 ergs of ionizing radiation (thus not limited to X- or 
gamma radiation) in one gram of any material at the place 
of interest. 
Unit or dose equivalent, where 1 rem is the amount of 
ionizing radiation of any type that produces the same 
damage in the human tissue as one rad of X-radiation at a 
defined energy. 
Unit of radiation defined in terms of the quantity of X- or 
gamma that produces the same number of ions pairs in one 
cubic centimeter of dry air that would be produce by one 
gram of radium at a specified distance. 
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